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Abstract Start-ups often post updates during equity
crowdfunding campaigns. However, little is known about
the effects of such updates on crowd participation. We
investigate this question by using hand-collected data from
71 funding campaigns and 39,399 investment decisions on
two German equity crowdfunding portals. Using a com-
bination of different empirical research techniques, we find
that posting an update has a significant positive effect on
the number of investments made by the crowd and the
investment amount collected by the start-up. This effect
does not occur immediately in its entirety; rather, it lags the
update by a few days. Furthermore, the effect of updates
loses statistical significance with the number of updates
posted during a campaign. We also find that an easier
language used in updates increases crowd participation,
whereas the length of updates has no effects. With respect
to the update’s content, we find that the positive effect can
be attributed to updates about new developments of the
start-up such as campaign developments, new funding,
business developments, and cooperation projects. Updates
on the start-up team, business model, product develop-
ments, and promotional campaigns do not have meaning-
ful effects. Our paper contributes to the literature on the
effects of information disclosure on equity crowdfunding
participation. Furthermore, our results have practical im-
plications for start-ups and their investor communication
during equity crowdfunding campaigns.
Keywords Crowdfunding . Entrepreneurial finance .
Updates . Investor communication
1 Introduction
Equity crowdfunding is an important tool for young and
innovative start-ups to collect early-stage funding. Prior
research has investigated the success drivers of equity
crowdfunding campaigns and has shown that informa-
tion provided by the start-up, such as the human and
social capital of the founders, risks involved, and finan-
cial projections, have a positive influence on campaign
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success (Ahlers et al. 2015; Moritz et al. 2015; Vismara
2016b; Polzin et al. 2017). This information usually
does not change during a crowdfunding campaign and
is typically provided by the start-up before a campaign
starts.
Our paper takes a more dynamic perspective than prior
research by investigating the role of updates provided by
start-ups during an equity crowdfunding campaign. We
analyze how start-ups can use updates during the campaign
to encourage the crowd to provide funding. This particular
determinant of equity crowdfunding participation has been
overlooked in the literature so far, and as such, there is an
important gap on the effects of information disclosure on
crowd participation (Ahlers et al. 2015; Moritz et al. 2015;
Bernstein et al. 2017; Vismara 2016b; Polzin et al. 2017).
Updates enable start-ups to signal their value to the crowd
and to establish credibility and legitimacy during a
crowdfunding campaign. We investigate three research
questions: First, we analyze whether updates and their
frequency have an influence on crowd participation and
whether the effect occurs immediately or in a lagged form
(Research Question 1 (RQ1)). Second, we investigate how
the language complexity used in the updates and the length
of the updates affect crowd participation (Research Ques-
tion 2 (RQ2)). And finally, we look at the content of these
updates to determine how the crowd reacts to different
signals and information communicated via updates (Re-
search Question 3 (RQ3)). Thus, we not only look at the
effects of updates on funding participation per se but also at
the effects of specific update characteristics and contents.
To answer our research questions, we investigate up-
dates posted by start-ups during an equity crowdfunding
campaign by using hand-collected data from 71 funding
campaigns and 39,399 investment decisions on two Ger-
man equity crowdfunding portals. We find an overall
positive effect of posting an update on the number of
investments by the crowd and the investment amount
collected by the start-up. However, this positive effect does
not occur immediately in its entirety; rather, it lags a few
days behind the respective update. The effect increases
with the ease of language used in the update. Furthermore,
we find that the first updates have positive but only mar-
ginally significant effects, while the later updates have no
significant effects on crowd participation. Large differ-
ences exist when distinguishing updates according to their
content. Updates that deal with the start-up team, business
model, product developments, and campaign promotions
do not have meaningful effects on crowd participation.
Instead, positive effects on funding participation can be
attributed to updates about campaign development, new
funding, business developments, and cooperation projects.
Our paper contributes to the entrepreneurial finance
literature (for recent overviews see Block et al. 2017a, b).
In particular, we contribute to research on the selection
criteria of early-stage investors looking at a new type of
investor—the crowd. It has been found that specific infor-
mation, such as education of the entrepreneurial team,
protection of intellectual property rights, the venture’s
network, and firm alliances, are important drivers for the
investment decisions of professional early-stage investors
such as venture capital funds (Audretsch et al. 2012; Baum
and Silverman 2004; Block et al. 2014, 2017a, b; Busenitz
et al. 2005; Franke et al. 2008; Jell et al. 2011). It has also
been shown that start-ups use this information to signal
their value to investors (Audretsch et al. 2012; Block et al.
2014; Connelly et al. 2011). Hence, our paper contributes
to research about signals in entrepreneurial finance by
looking at the specific context of crowdfunding and
crowdinvestors as a new type of venture investor. Further-
more, we add to the growing research on crowdfunding
and in particular on equity crowdfunding. Our paper ex-
tends this literature by taking a dynamic perspective, in-
vestigating how start-ups can signal their value during a
crowdfunding campaign using updates as communication
tools to increase the likelihood of successful campaigns.
In addition to its contribution to the academic literature,
our paper’s results also have practical implications for
start-ups and crowdfunding platforms. For start-ups, it is
worthwhile to learn more about the effects of updates on
equity crowdfunding participation. By posting updates,
start-ups can actively influence the chances of successfully
completing their equity crowdfunding campaigns. Our
results show, for example, that the specific content of an
update is key, while simply posting more updates has little
effect. Knowingwhich updates drive funding participation
is crucial for start-ups to design an effective and successful
communication in equity crowdfunding campaigns. For
platforms, this information is important to encourage start-
ups to publish updates with content valued by the crowd to
increase the likelihood of a successful campaign and ulti-
mately, the platforms’ own business success.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section provides the theoretical framework of our
study and develops hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the
data sources and the research techniques used to code and
categorize the updates posted by the start-ups during the
campaigns. Based on this, we introduce the variables used
in the regression analysis and explain our empirical model.
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Section 4 presents the descriptive and multivariate results.
The final two sections discuss our results, link them to the
crowdfunding and entrepreneurial finance literatures, and
summarize our contributions to theory and practice.
2 Theoretical framework and hypotheses
2.1 Signaling theory
Our theoretical framework is based on signaling theory,
which is primarily concerned with reducing information
asymmetries between two parties, where the better in-
formed party sends a quality signal to the less informed
party (Connelly et al. 2011). In a seminal article, Spence
(1973) applied this theory to the labor market, demonstrat-
ing how job applicants can use their higher education as
effective signals to reduce their potential employers’ infor-
mation deficits. Since then, signaling theory has been used
in various research fields such as strategic management,
entrepreneurship, labor economics, and human resource
management (Connelly et al. 2011). The core concept of
signaling theory is summarized in Fig. 1. The key elements
are the signaler, the signal, the receiver, and the signaling
environment. Signalers are information insiders who pos-
sess private information about an individual, a product, or
an organization that is not available to outsiders (Spence
1973; Connelly et al. 2011). Signalers deliberately send
positive signals to information outsiders to reduce informa-
tion asymmetries and cause a reaction by the receiver, for
example, the investment in a company (Certo 2003;
Busenitz et al. 2005). However, for signals to be effective,
they need to fulfill twomain characteristics: First, they need
to be observable because otherwise they would not be
perceived by the receiver. Second, signals need to be costly,
otherwise theywould be too easy to fake or imitate (Spence
1973). Signaler and receiver have—at least in part—con-
flicting interests: The signaler would gain from sending
inferior signals and therefore has an incentive to deceive
the receiver (Ross 1977). As receivers are disadvantaged by
acting on false signals, they learn to ignore these signals and
perceive the signaler as dishonest (Connelly et al. 2011).
Signal effectiveness can be enhanced by communicating
signals frequently and with a high signal consistency
(Janney and Folta 2003; Fischer and Reuber 2014). This
increases the chances that receivers capture the signal and
are not confused by different signal contents (Gulati and
Higgins 2003; Gao et al. 2008). This is directly related to
the role of receivers’ characteristics for signal effectiveness
(Perkins and Hendry 2005). In addition to the required
attention of receivers to capture the signal, different re-
ceivers are likely to interpret signals differently (Perkins
andHendry 2005). This signal translationmight even result
in a diversion of the signals’ original intent (Branzei et al.
2004; Highhouse et al. 2007). Hence, signal clarity is
another important characteristic of a signal so that the
signaler can achieve the desired effect (Certo 2003;
Warner et al. 2006). In this context, countersignals send
by receivers as feedback to the signaler can provide addi-
tional information about the effectiveness of the signal
(Srivastava 2001; Connelly et al. 2011). Finally, the signal-
ing environment can influence the signals’ effectiveness.
Distortions of the signal can occur, for example, whenever
the signal medium reduces its observability (Carter 2006;
Fischer and Reuber 2014). In addition, other receivers’
interpretation can affect the effectiveness of signals. If a
number of receivers interpret signals in a specific way, this
might lead to imitation by others (McNamara et al. 2008;
Connelly et al. 2011).
2.2 Updates by the start-ups as signals in crowdfunding
2.2.1 Visibility of updates and its effects on crowd
participation
In the context of entrepreneurial finance, information
asymmetries between a start-up’s management team and
potential investors play a major role. Ventures need to
find a way to signal their quality to potential investors to
establish legitimacy and credibility and to receive fi-
nancing (Rao et al. 2008; Zimmerman and Zeitz
2002). In the specific setting of crowdfunding, start-
ups aim to collect capital from a large number of mostly
anonymous investors, who contribute small amounts of
money via the Internet (Moritz et al. 2015; Belleflamme
et al. 2014; Hemer et al. 2011; Hornuf and
Schwienbacher 2016). The average crowdfunding in-
vestor is not likely to have the time, capacity, and
incentive to investigate firms and their business model
in detail (Ahlers et al. 2015; Lukkarinen et al. 2016).
Due to the specific characteristics of crowdfunding,
establishing personal relationships to reduce informa-
tion asymmetries typical for business angel or venture
capital investments (Landström 1992; Sapienza and
Korsgaard 1996; Kollmann and Kuckertz 2006) is not
feasible in equity crowdfunding markets. Hence, com-
panies need to find alternative ways to communicate
their value to the crowd.
Which updates increase crowd participation?
Prior research found that updates provided by start-ups
can increase funding success (Hornuf and Schwienbacher
2015; Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017; Mollick 2014; Xu
et al. 2014; Wu et al. 2015). Updates are a one-sided
communication tool often used during a campaign as it
can be applied flexibly by the start-up to provide additional
information about the product, the start-up, or the cam-
paign. Hence, referring to the concept of signaling theory
(see Fig. 1), our focus in this study is on the signal
communicated via updates to convey the start-up’s value
to the crowd. In line with prior research on reward-based
crowdfunding (Mollick 2014; Kromidha and Robson
2016), we propose that updates in general have a positive
effect on equity crowdfunding participation as they typi-
cally are highly visible and observable for potential inves-
tors. Even though updates might not always be costly for
the signaler,1 they reduce search costs for investors. Hence,
we expect:
H1: Updates provided by the start-up have a pos-
itive effect on crowd participation.
However, as updates are posted on the campaign
website of the crowdfunding portal, potential investors
only see the update if they visit the website. Therefore,
start-ups and crowdfunding portals typically also commu-
nicate these updates in their social media channels or via
newsletters to increase investors’ awareness of the update.
Furthermore, posting an update has typically no immediate
effect on crowd participation because investors’ need some
time to learn about the update and to pledge their money
(Wheat et al. 2013; Mollick 2014; Kromidha and Robson
2016; Vismara 2016b). Hence, the visibility of updates and
their effect on crowd participation is likely to be delayed by
a few days.
H2: The effect of updates on crowd participation
does not occur immediately in its entirety but is
delayed by a few days.
In addition, it has been shown that the communication
of credible signals is not a static but an ongoing process
(Janney and Folta 2003). Signaling can be used to inform
investors about the developments of the start-up. The
optimal number of signals provided depends on the prog-
ress of the start-up since communicating the last credible
signal (Janney and Folta 2003). Therefore, we expect using
updates regularly to send signals to the crowd has a
positive effect on equity crowdfunding participation. How-
ever, during a crowdfunding campaignwhich typically has
a funding period of around two months, new develop-
mentswhich can be communicated to investors are limited.
An increasing number of updates might even be perceived
by investors as unreliable or cheap talk as no further
information value can be delivered (Perkins and Hendry
2005; Block et al. 2014). Therefore, we expect that the
marginal value of updates will decrease as the updates no
longer providemuch additional value to potential investors
Fig. 1 Concept of signaling theory
1 As we do not observe the start-ups over a longer time period, we
cannot evaluate if the signals send during the campaign are reliable and
costly for the signaller. Hence, we have to exclude the cost dimension
from our analysis.
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(Janney and Folta 2003, 2006; Block et al. 2014). Hence,
we suggest that a negative relationship exists between the
number of updates posted and their effect on crowd
participation:
H3: The effect of updates on crowd participation
decreases with the number of updates posted by the
start-up.
2.2.2 Clarity of updates and its effects on crowd
participation
Signaling theory has shown that signals need to be visible
and clear so that market participants are able to capture the
information content of the signal (Certo 2003;Warner et al.
2006). The clarity of the signal directly relates to the inter-
pretation by receivers: Members of a group of very hetero-
geneous receivers are more likely to translate the signal
differently (Perkins and Hendry 2005; Connelly et al.
2011). As the receivers of signals in crowdfunding markets
have been found to be very heterogeneous (Ahlers et al.
2015), the clarity of the signal is particularly important.
Clarity, however, depends on the complexity of the lan-
guage used in the updates. Hence, we propose that updates
using a complex language are more difficult to understand,
loose clarity and therefore their effectiveness as a signal:
H4: The effect of updates on crowd participation
decreases with the complexity of the language used
in the update.
Furthermore, previous research found that the length
of descriptions in crowdfunding campaigns have a sig-
nificant positive effect on the campaign outcome
(Greiner and Wang 2010; Gao and Lin 2014). Longer
descriptions can deliver more information about the
project, the start-up, or the product and can help to
reduce information asymmetries between the start-up
and potential investors. Hence, we propose:
H5: The effect of updates on crowd participation
increases with the length of the update.
2.2.3 Content of updates and its effects on crowd
participation
Prior research in entrepreneurial finance found that the content
of signals provided by the start-up plays an important role.
Ventures can use a number of different signals to reduce
information asymmetries by communicating their value to
potential investors, such as the entrepreneurial team educa-
tion, intellectual property rights, and the share of retained
equity (Audretsch et al. 2012; Baum and Silverman 2004;
Block et al. 2014; Busenitz et al. 2005).
Even though crowdfunding research is still young, a
number of different signals have been found to have a
positive effect on crowd participation. However, it needs
to be considered that investors’ motivations have been
shown to depend on the specific crowdfunding model
(Cholakova and Clarysse 2015; Lukkarinen et al. 2016;
Vulkan et al. 2016; Polzin et al. 2017), which suggests
that the effects of updates and the signals used also differ
according to the crowdfunding model. Focusing on
findings in relation to venture financing with a profit
participation of investors, the content of these signals
can be roughly summarized into information about the
start-up’s quality (i.e., the management team, its pre-
paredness and openness, and the start-up’s financials)
and external credentials provided by third parties (i.e.,
through social networks, reputable investors, protection
of intellectual property, reception of grants, and the
reaction by the crowd). Table 1 provides an overview
of the findings from prior crowdfunding research.
However, none of these studies focuses on the dy-
namic aspects of providing new and ongoing signals to
investors using updates during equity crowdfunding
campaigns. Our study is—to the best of our knowl-
edge—the first to look into this important research
question.
We refrain from ex ante assumptions and use an
exploratory approach and formulate the following open
research question: BHow does the type of content pro-
vided in the update influence crowd participation?^.
Figure 2 summarizes our three research questions and
hypotheses.
3 Data and method
3.1 Data sources
Our empirical analysis uses data from two German
equity crowdfundingportals over the period from June 7,
2012, to April 27, 2015. The two portals are Seedmatch
and Companisto, which are important players in the
German equity crowdfunding market and together rep-
resent about 75% of the overall crowdfunding capital
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raised during our observation period. For Companisto,
we hand collected data on all 36 campaigns that were
completed until the end of the observation period. For
Seedmatch, we were able to hand collect data on 29 of
78 campaigns.We could collect investment data on only
about half of the campaigns for Seedmatch because the
portal takes information about individual investments
immediately off the website once the campaign termi-
nates. We therefore could not collect data for the cam-
paigns that ended before June 7, 2012. For some cam-
paigns, we were simply too slow to hand collect the data
from the website.
Some start-ups such asMeine-Spielzeugkiste ran two
campaigns on the same portal. Furthermore, Aoterra,
Table 1 Prior research about the effects of signals in equity crowdfunding
Category Signals Effect Reference to Study
Team Management team’s
education (MBA)
+ Quality disclosure Ahlers et al. (2015)
Soft facts + Openness; transparency Moritz et al. (2015)
Financials Financial information about
the start-up
+ Quality disclosure; preparedness Ahlers et al. (2015), Lukkarinen et al. (2016),
Polzin et al. (2017)
Share of retained equity Mixed Entrepreneurial intention Ahlers et al. (2015), Ralcheva and
Roosenboom (2016), Vismara (2016a)
External
certification
Social network (size) Mixed Social capital; quality disclosure;
larger investor base
Ahlers et al. (2015), Lukkarinen et al. (2016),
Vismara (2016a)
Reputable investors
(business angels, experts)
+ Quality disclosure; certification Kim and Viswanathan (2013), Ralcheva and
Roosenboom (2016)
Investors with large
investments
+ Quality disclosure Vulkan et al. (2016)
Intellectual capital (patents) Mixed Quality disclosure Ahlers et al. (2015), Ralcheva and
Roosenboom (2016)
Reception of grants None Quality disclosure Ralcheva and Roosenboom (2016)
Campaign
developments
Funds already raised + Social capital; observational
learning
Agrawal et al. (2015), Vulkan et al. (2016)
Number of capital providers + Social capital; observational
learning
Mohammadi and Shafi (2017)
Fig. 2 Research questions (RQ) and hypotheses
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Controme, Ledora, Payme, Protonnet, and Riboxx
reached their respective funding limits quickly and sub-
sequently decided to raise more capital. On average, it
took these start-ups six days to initiate the campaign
again. We have counted these rounds as independent
campaigns, as investors could not anticipate that a sec-
ond round would quickly follow the end of the first
round and thus most likely did not adapt their invest-
ment behavior accordingly. Overall, we were able to
analyze 39,399 investment decisions within 71 unique
funding campaigns. In line with Kuppuswamy and
Bayus (2017), we then constructed a panel data set that
aggregates the number of investments in a particular
campaign on a given day. The time dimension of the
panel data set is the duration of the campaign in days,
while the cross-sectional dimension refers to the
campaigns.
3.2 Dependent variables
In our empirical analysis, we use two different dependent
variables: the number of investments and the amount of
capital pledged during an equity crowdfunding campaign
on a given day. This allows us to investigate the effects of
updates on the number of crowd investments as well as the
amount of money pledged.
3.3 Explanatory variables
To investigate H1 and H2, we consider the variable
Update, which measures the number of updates posted
during a campaign on a given day. In different specifi-
cations, the variable is lagged by 1 day or alternatively
measures the number of updates that were posted during
the course of one week. To investigate the frequency by
which a start-up posts updates during the course of a
campaign as outlined in H3, we consider the variable
Update Number, which captures the number of updates
that have been previously posted by the start-up during a
particular crowdfunding campaign. Furthermore, to in-
vestigate H4, we use the Flesch Readability Index
(Flesch Index) that measures the language complexity
of an update (Flesch 1948). More precisely, we use the
Breading ease^ rating of the Flesch index defining a
seven-item scale, where 1 corresponds to a Flesch index
of 0–30 (very difficult language) and 7 to a Flesch index
of 91–100 (very easy language) (Courtis 1995; Flesch
1948). Finally, in order to test H5 we consider the
variable Words, which captures the text length of an
update.
To identify the information included in the updates
posted by the start-up, we develop a coding system that
categorizes the information contained in the campaign
updates. For this purpose, we used the software package
MaxQDA, which allowed us to analyze qualitative data.
In a first step, we generated an initial list of update
categories based on our prior knowledge and previous
research on investment decis ions in equity
crowdfunding (Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2015;
Moritz et al. 2015; Moritz and Block 2015; Vismara
2016a, 2016b). During the coding process, we expanded
this initial coding system by using an iterative and
inductive process to cover all relevant information pro-
vided by the updates (Miles andHuberman 1994). Then,
we merged similar categories and finally developed a
system of categories with higher dimensions (Gioia
et al. 2012; Miles and Huberman 1994). Our final cod-
ing system consists of nine categories of updates: Team,
Business Model, External Certification, Product Devel-
opment, Cooperation Projects, Campaign Develop-
ment, New Funding, Business Development, and
Promotions.
The category Team contains all the information about
the start-up’s founders and employees, such as their
education, age, and personal interests. In the category
Business Model, we coded updates on the start-up’s
business model, market, business idea, future business
orientation, and expansion aspirations. External Certifi-
cation comprises updates where the start-ups informed
investors about external certification through expert
opinions, recommendations, awards won by the start-
up, patent applications, press coverage, and participa-
tions at trade fares, conferences, or organized talks. The
category Product Development contains information
about the start-up’s product, target customers, new prod-
uct innovations, and introduction of prototypes. Infor-
mation about new cooperation projects by the start-up is
coded in the category Cooperation Projects. Campaign
Development contains information about developments
of the crowdfunding campaign, such as the current
number of investors, funding amount, and announce-
ments about increases in the funding limit. Financing
provided by other market participants, such as business
angels, venture capitalists, or the government (i.e., pub-
lic grants or subsidies), is included in the category New
Funding. The category Business Development contains
information about the financial development of the start-
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up (e.g., sales development and turnover) as well as
customer updates (e.g., the number of customers or
new customers). Finally, the category Promotion con-
tains information about promotions, networking via so-
cial media, current events to meet crowd investors and
appeals to investors to support the company with mar-
keting activities or recommendations. A detailed over-
view of the categories, including some examples, is
provided in Table 5 of the Appendix.
To ensure that our coding system is reliable and
coherent, detailed explanations were provided for each
category. Then, a second researcher, who was not in-
volved in the project, coded 20% of the updates. This
allowed us to ensure that the coding categories were
exhaustive and that they have a high degree of objectiv-
ity. The inter-rater reliability using Cohen’s Kappa indi-
cated good agreement between us and the external re-
searcher (the average Cohen’s Kappa for all categories
was 0.65) (Fleiss et al. 2003; Landis and Koch 1977). To
permit even higher consistency in the coding, the coding
system was then discussed with the external researcher
and adapted when necessary. Afterwards, both re-
searchers coded again all 234 updates of the 71 equity
crowdfunding campaigns. Once again, an inter-rater
reliability analysis was conducted to ensure coding con-
sistency between the researchers. Again, we used
Cohen’s Kappa as a statistical measure of inter-rater
reliability for the coding of the nine main update cate-
gories. Cohen’s Kappa for the individual categories
ranged from 0.70 to 0.96; the average Cohen’s Kappa
of 0.84 for all categories indicates excellent agreement
between us and the external researcher.
3.4 Control variables and fixed effects
Following prior research on funding dynamics in equity
crowdfunding (Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2015; Vismara
2016b),we included several control variables in our baseline
regression. To account for campaign participation before the
focal day, we control for the amount of capital raised during
the crowdfunding campaign until the previous day
(Ln(Amount)0 → t −1). While this variable indicates how
much capital has already been invested, it does not capture
how many investors supported the campaign and whether
more investors might provide a signal regarding the collec-
tive wisdom of the crowd. Since we cannot uniquely iden-
tify investors across portals by using their name and location
(i.e., there might be two or more Thomas Mueller living in
Munich and investing on the two portals), we consider the
number of investments to be the best available proxy for the
number of investors that have invested until the previous
day (#Investments0 → t −1).
Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2015) show that invest-
ments slow down under first-come, first-serve funding
mechanism once the funding goal is reached.We therefore
include the dummy variable Post Funded, which equals 1
if the funding goal is reached and 0 otherwise. In line with
Cumming and Zhang (2016) as well as Kuppuswamy and
Bayus (2017), we include a variable that captures the
number of active campaigns across four major German
equity crowdfunding portals, including the two portals in
our data set as well as Innovestment and United Equity
(Active Campaigns).2 Similarly, we include a variable that
captures the number of investments made on these four
portals on a given day (Competing Investments). This
variable is included to capture potential BBlockbuster
Effects^ (Kickstarter 2012; Doshi 2014), where a popular
and widely visible campaign steals investors away from
other campaigns. Vismara (2016a) shows that equity re-
tention influences crowdfunding success. Since start-ups
on German equity crowdfunding portals do not issue
equity shares but some mezzanine form of investment
(equity shares are too expensive to transfer as a costly
notary must be involved and the platform requires an
authorization by the German Securities Regulator), we
calculate the quasi-equity share offered to the crowd. This
is the percentage of the minimum amount of capital re-
quested over the pre-money valuation of the start-up (Eq-
uity Share). Finally, to control for portal characteristics, we
include a dummy variable (Seedmatch) that is equal to 1 if
the campaign is run on Seedmatch and 0 if it is run on
Companisto.
However, given that wemight not have controlled for
all relevant explanatory variables, we also consider a
range of fixed effects. First, we include campaign fixed
effects as they help us to remove any time-invariant
heterogeneity from the focal campaign, such as the type
of financial contract used, specific clauses that have
been defined, or the industry of the start-up. Second,
we include various fixed effects that capture the time of
the investments, such as the day of the week, the month
of the year, the respective year, and the day of the
funding cycle.While endogeneity in the form ofmissing
2 We do not consider the portals Innovestment and United Equity in
our analysis, as the former does not allow founders to post updates on
the portal website and because we simply did not observe updates
during the running of the campaigns for the latter.
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variables is an inevitable problem in empirical research,
the controls we consider here should capture the most
relevant observable and unobservable missing variables.
3.5 Empirical models
Because the first dependent variable is measured as
a count variable and because its unconditional vari-
ance suffers from overdispersion, we estimate a neg-
ative binomial regression model. The results of a
Hausman test led us to dismiss the random-effects
estimator as being inconsistent. We therefore esti-
mate a fixed effects negative binomial (FENB) mod-
el, which is a pseudo panel estimator that allows us
to include time-invariant measures into the regres-
sion, such as the variables Equity Share and
Seedmatch. In our baseline specification, we esti-
mate the following FENB model:
Pr yi1; yi2;…yiTð Þ ¼ FðLn Amountð Þi;0→t−1 þ Investmentsi;0→t−1 þ Post Fundedit þ Number of Active Campaignst
þ Number of Competing Investmentst þ Post Fundedit þ Equity Sharei þ Seedmatchi
þ Updateit þ Update Numberit þ DoWt þMoYt þ Yeart þ DoICit þ CampaigniÞ
where y is the number of investments in campaign i on day
t. F(.) represents a negative binomial distribution function
as in Baltagi (2008). We specify campaign fixed effects
denoted by Campaign. DoW is a vector of dummies that
indicates the day of the week.MoY is a vector of dummies
for the month of the year.Year is a vector of dummies for
the respective years. In line with Kuppuswamy and Bayus
(2017),DoIC is a vector of dummies that indicates the first
and the last 7 days of the funding campaign.
For the second dependent variable, which mea-
sures the amount of capital that was pledged on a
given day, we run a simple OLS panel regression.
The results of a modified Hausman test again led
us to dismiss the random-effects estimator as being
inconsistent. We therefore run a standard OLS fixed
effects panel data model. However, this model does
not allow us to identify time-invariant campaign
effects, as the time-invariant heterogeneity will be
differenced out by the estimator. We therefore can
no longer identify the effect of the variables Equity
Share and Seedmatch. The baseline OLS model
takes the following form:
Ln Amountð Þit ¼ Ln Amountð Þi;0→t−1 þ Investmentsi;0→t−1 þ Post Fundedit þ Number of Active Campaignst
þ Number of Competing Investmentst þ Post Fundedit þ Updateit þ Update Numberit
þ DoWt þMoYt þ Yeart þ DoICit þ Campaignit þ uit:
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
For the 71 equity crowdfunding campaigns over the period
from June 7, 2012, to April 27, 2015, we observe 5210
campaign days, which are defined as days when investors
had the opportunity to invest in a specific equity
crowdfunding campaign. Overall, the start-ups running
these campaigns posted 234 updates, with an average of
3.30 updates per campaign.However, while some start-ups
did not post a single update, others have extensively used
this tool to inform the crowd and encourage investor partic-
ipation. During the campaign ofMyParfum, for instance, a
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total of 14 updates were posted. Interestingly, some update
categories were posted more frequently than others. For
example, investors were more often informed about the
business model, promotional campaigns, the latest product
developments, and the external certifications of the start-up
than about recent campaign developments or the start-up
team. Start-ups rarely disclosed updates on new funding.
During most of the campaign days, no update was posted.
Every 25 days, start-ups posted an update and occasionally
even two updates were posted on the same day. The mean
update contained 289words (median: 248words).
The 71 campaigns in our sample were run by 63 unique
start-ups. Some start-ups ran multiple campaigns on differ-
ent or sometimes the same portal. All of these start-ups are
locatedinGermany.Mostof themoperatein theinformation
and communication, wholesale and retail, as well as
manufacturing sectors. Regarding the campaign develop-
ment, on 86% of the campaign days, the start-ups had
already surpassed the funding goal, and the founders of the
start-up thus knew that they would ultimately receive the
capital (Post Funded). Table 2 also shows that, on average,
7.56 investments were made on a campaign day and that
5886.74 € were pledged by the crowd. On some days, the
crowd invested as much as 1.5 million € in a single cam-
paign, while on other days, they withdrew 10,000 € of
investments. On average, 436.85 investments were made
before an investor decided to invest. On a given campaign
day,40.37investmentsweremadein theoverallmarket,and
6.55 campaignswere run in addition to the campaign under
consideration. Table 6 in the Appendix shows a correlation
table that includes the dependent variables and the main
explanatory variables.
4.2 Results of the baseline regression models
Table 3 shows the regression results for our baseline
models. For theFENBmodel,we report incident rate ratios,
which can be interpreted as multiplicative effects or semi-
elasticities.3 In line with prior research (Hornuf and
Schwienbacher 2015), we find that 100 additional invest-
ments until the previous day reduce the number of invest-
ments on a given day by 9% and the amount invested by
32%. Once the campaign was successfully funded, the
investment amounts on a given day decrease on average
by 63%. Moreover, when other campaigns received 100
additional investments, the campaign under consideration
received 8% more investments and 24% more capital was
pledged.This findingmay result fromageneral boom in the
equitycrowdfundingsectorafterperiodsofextensivemedia
coverage positively reporting about this method of financ-
ing. Portal differences exist, with Seedmatch campaigns—
dependingon the specification—attractingonaverage60 to
82%fewerinvestments thanCompanistocampaigns,which
is most likely due to the fact that the minimum investment
ticket ofSeedmatch is 50 times larger than the5€minimum
ticket of Companisto. Furthermore, while the day of the
week dummies show that less investment activities take
placeduringtheweekendandthat thecampaigndaysfollow
the L-shaped pattern as described in Hornuf and
Schwienbacher (2015), no consistent pattern emerges for
any of the other fixed effects.
In accordance with H1, we find that updates positively
influence crowd participation. While the effect does not
take place immediately, we locate a significant effect for
the number of investments the following day. Further-
more, updates posted over the course of 1 week do not
only influence the number of investments but also the
amount invested, with one more update increasing the
number of investments by 16% and the amount invested
by 40%.We interpret this as strong support for our H1 and
H2. In a next step, we investigate whether the frequency
by which updates are posted exhibits a particular relation-
ship. Figure 3 reports the predictive margins for the
number of updates posted during a campaign. It shows
that while the effect is positive except for such high
numbers as 14 updates, the standard errors are steadily
increasing with the number of updates, stifling any statis-
tically significant effect as more updates are posted. Thus,
we do not find support for H3.
4.3 Update categories and their effect on crowd
participation
First, as outlined in RQ2 and RQ3, Table 4 investi-
gates how the complexity of the language used in
updates, the length of the updates, and the content of
updates influences crowd participation. As in the
previous regressions, we do not find any immediate
3 For example, the coefficient ofCompeting Investments in Table 3Model
1 is 1.08. It indicates that an increase of the explanatory variable (which is
measured in 100 competing investments) corresponds to a 1.08 times
change in the dependent variable. In this case, the dependent variable—
the number of investments per day—increases by 8% if 100 more
competing investments are made in other campaigns. On the other hand,
the coefficient of #Investments (which is measured in 100 previous
investments) is 0.91. This time, the coefficient indicates that an increase
of the explanatory variable corresponds to a 0.91 times change in the
dependent variable. Thus, the dependent variable decreases by 9% if 100
more investments are made by the crowd until the previous day.
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effect for our explanatory variables. The evidence
shows, however, that updates with an easier lan-
guage increase crowd participation as measured by
the number of investments the following day. No
such effect, however, exists for the amount invested.
Furthermore, the average ease of the language over
the course of the last week did neither affect the
number nor the amount of investments, indicating
that an easier language attracts more investors right
after the update was posted but not over a longer
time period. Hence, we only find partial support for
H4. Regarding the length of updates, we do not find
any statistically significant effect on crowd partici-
pation. Hence, H5 is not supported by our results.
In a next step, we investigate RQ3 by analyzing the
type of information communicated via updates. In line
with our previous findings, none of the different update
categories had an immediate effect on crowd participa-
tion. However, we find a positive and significant effect
for New Funding, with one more update of this category
increasing the number of investments by 45% the fol-
lowing day. Furthermore,Cooperation Projects also has
a positive effect on the amount invested by the crowd,
leading to a 52% increase of the amount invested the
following day. When analyzing the update activities that
took place over the course of 1 week, we find that
information about Campaign Developments, New
Funding, and Business Development attract additional
investors, thereby increasing the number of investments
by 17%, 51%, and 19%, respectively. When looking at
the long-run effects of updates over the course of an
entire week, we also find that information about New
Table 2 Summary statistics
Std. dev. Std. dev. Std. dev.
Variable Mean Median (overall) (between) (within) Min. Max. N Obs.
#Investments 7.56 3 26.56 133.54 19.14 0 1107 5210
Amount 5886.74 1000 34,134.60 18,0791.10 24,356.27 −10,000 1,499,750 5210
Ln(Amount) 5.98 7 3.18 2.35 2.76 0 14 5210
#Investments0 → t − 1 436.85 315 387.95 303.35 166.38 0 1966 5210
Ln(Amount) 0 → t − 1 11.85 12 1.88 1.85 1.41 0 16 5210
Post Funded = 1 0.86 1 0.35 0.27 0.23 0 1 5210
Active Campaigns 6.55 7 2.36 2.20 1.43 0 12 5210
Competing Investments 40.37 25 67.05 17.97 64.86 0 1158 5210
Equity Share 2.36 2 1.55 1.51 0.00 1 8 5210
Seedmatch = 1 0.45 0 0.50 0.50 0.00 0 1 5210
Update 0.04 0 0.21 0.09 0.20 0 2 5210
Update Number 0.18 0 1.00 0.32 0.98 0 14 5210
Flesch Index 0.12 0 0.57 0.28 0.55 0 5 5210
Words 12.82 0 70.42 18.19 69.09 0 939 5210
Update Categories Yes
Team = 1 0.01 0 0.09 0.02 0.09 41 5210
Business Model = 1 0.02 0 0.14 0.07 0.14 110 5210
External Certification = 1 0.02 0 0.13 0.02 0.13 91 5210
Product Development = 1 0.02 0 0.14 0.03 0.13 97 5210
Cooperation Projects = 1 0.01 0 0.11 0.02 0.11 67 5210
Campaign Development = 1 0.01 0 0.10 0.06 0.10 51 5210
New Funding = 1 0.00 0 0.05 0.01 0.05 15 5210
Business Development = 1 0.01 0 0.12 0.02 0.12 75 5210
Promotions = 1 0.02 0 0.14 0.06 0.14 102 5210
This table shows summary statistics of our main variables. All variables are defined in Table 5 in the Appendix.
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Funding and Business Development both increase the
amount of funding on subsequent days by 58%. Exter-
nal Certification, in contrast, has a negative effect on the
amount invested, which might arise because updates on
external certificates provide a dubious signal to the
crowd: these start-ups are unable to obtain funding other
than equity crowdfunding even though they have ob-
tained an external certificate such as a patent.
Finally, in Tables 7 and 8 in the Appendix, we investi-
gate RQ2 and RQ3 in more detail by analyzing the effect
Table 3 Baseline regressions
Investments (#) Ln(Amount (€))
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable lag None 1 day 1 week None 1 day 1 week
Control variables
(no lags included)
Ln(Amount0 → t − 1) 1.04 1.03 1.26 0.08 0.08 −0.86
(0.07) (0.04) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.58)
#Investments0 → t − 1 / 100 0.91** 0.91*** 0.92 −0.32*** −0.32*** −0.22
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.20)
Post Funded Dummy 1.05 1.06 0.99 −0.63** −0.64** 0.59
(0.11) (0.12) (0.20) (0.29) (0.29) (0.50)
Active Projects 1.02 1.02 1.02 −0.05 −0.05 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Competing Investments / 100 1.08*** 1.08** 1.06 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.15
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Equity Share 0.89 0.89 1.15
(0.07) (0.08) (0.13)
Seedmatch Dummy 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.18**
(0.09) (0.10) (0.16)
Explanatory variables
(lags according to table head)
Update 1.14 1.19** 1.16** 0.04 0.23 0.40**
(0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.19) (0.25) (0.19)
Update Number 1.01 1.03 0.93** 0.08 0.11 0.08
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.13)
Fixed effects
Campaign Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Day-of-week Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes**
Month Yes Yes Yes*** Yes Yes Yes**
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes*** Yes**
Day-of-funding-cycle Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Log likelihood −12,536.57 −12,525.83 −2964.41
Adj. R2 0.14 0.14 0.08
N Investments days 5209 5209 5209 5201 5201 5201
N Campaigns 70 70 70 71 71 71
This table shows results of our baseline regressions as specified in Section 3.5. Next to the variables reported in the table, the baseline
regressions also include dummy variables for the campaign, day of the week, month of the year, year effects, as well as the first and last
7 days of the campaign. Variable definitions are reported in Table 5. The dependent variable in column (1) is the number of investments and
in column (2) the Ln(Amount) of investments in a specific campaign and day. The data takes panel data structure. The method of estimation
in column (1) is the negative binomial fixed effects panel estimator (standard errors are bootstrapped) and in column (2) the OLS fixed effects
panel estimator (standard errors are clustered on campaign level). Standard errors are reported in brackets
Significance levels for coefficients: **<5%, ***<1%
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of updates in different industries (communication, whole-
sale, and retail, as well as manufacturing) and different
portals (Companisto and Seedmatch). The results indicate
that a simple language is particularly important in
crowdfunding campaigns from themanufacturing domain,
while the information content of an update appears to be
less important there. By contrast, during the course of one
week, information about Cooperation Projects, New
Funding, Business Development, and Promotional Cam-
paigns had a particularly positive and statistically signifi-
cant effect in the wholesale and retail industry. Finally,
while Cooperation Projects had a positive effect on the
amount pledged on Seedmatch, information about Cam-
paign Development and Business Development appeared
to be more important for the crowd that invested on
Companisto. These results show that start-ups must con-
sider whether a specific information content works for the
campaign under consideration and whether the crowd on a
particular portal is likely to respond to it.
5 Discussion, limitations, and further research
We began with the question whether and to what extent
updates posted by start-ups during an equity crowdfunding
campaign influence crowd participation. We argued that
updates are a tool to signal the start-up’s quality to potential
investors during a crowdfunding campaign. Based on this
main research objective, we further investigated whether
the frequency of updates has a positive effect on crowd
participation and whether the effect occurs immediately or
in a lagged form (RQ1). Our results show that there is
indeed a statistically and economically significant effect of
updates on crowd participation. Posting an update in-
creases both the number of investments by the crowd
and the investment amount collected. However, this effect
does not occur immediately in its entirety; rather, it lags
behind the update by a few days. In addition, our findings
suggest that even though investors value signals provided
by start-ups, an increasing number of updates seem to
result in a loss of credibility and might even be perceived
as cheap talk as additional updates no longer have a
statistically significant effect on crowd participation.
Furthermore, we argued that the clarity of updates is
important for crowd participation (RQ2). We measured the
clarity of updates in terms of language complexity and
update length. We find that the clarity of updates does not
seem to be of particular relevance to the crowd.Even though
our findings suggest that an easier readability has a positive
effect on crowd participation the day after the update was
posted, this effect is lost after a fewdays. This result suggests
that crowd investors do not seem particularly concerned
about language complexity. However, the readability of
most updates was relatively homogenous with a Flesch
index between 40 and 65 (categories 2–4) targeting readers
with a good or very good education (Courtis 1995). Only a
small number of updates had a readability index in the
category Bvery difficult^ and none in the categories Beasy^
and Bvery easy.^ This result might be due to a good
education of crowd investors and the entrepreneur posting
Fig. 3 Predictive margins
regarding the effects of updates
on crowd participation. The figure
reports predictive margins for the
number of an update in an equity
crowdfunding campaign. It
reveals that the first updates have
a positive but only marginally
significant effect, while the latter
updates have no significant effect
on crowd participation
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the update as well as the expectation of the crowd that start-
ups communicate in a more sophisticated way to demon-
strate their preparedness to establish and run a successful
company (Mollick 2014; Ahlers et al. 2015).
While recent research shows that entrepreneurs strategi-
cally engage in update communication (Dorfleitner et al.
2017), our results reveal that the type of information pro-
vided in the update plays an important role for equity
Table 4 Effects of update categories on crowd participation
Investments (#) Ln(Amount (€))
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable lag None 1 day 1 week None 1 day 1 week
Explanatory variables
(lags according to table head)
Flesch Index 1.02 1.07** 1.00 0.11 0.04 0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.00) (0.08) (0.09) (0.00)
Words / 100 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.09 0.06 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06)
Team 1.05 0.87 1.08 −0.26 −0.33 0.22
(0.16) (0.09) (0.14) (0.31) (0.34) (0.21)
Business Model 1.10 0.92 0.91 −0.50 −0.21 −0.04
(0.15) (0.12) (0.06) (0.28) (0.32) (0.22)
External Certification 0.87 1.10 1.11 −0.19 −0.43 −0.54**
(0.13) (0.18) (0.10) (0.22) (0.33) (0.24)
Product Development 0.92 0.99 1.06 0.17 0.14 0.07
(0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.28) (0.26) (0.15)
Cooperation Projects 1.16 1.07 0.97 0.13 0.52** 0.27
(0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.23) (0.23) (0.20)
Campaign Development 1.15 1.21 1.17** −0.13 0.55 0.24
(0.14) (0.19) (0.08) (0.30) (0.31) (0.18)
New Funding 0.76 1.45** 1.51*** 0.36 0.74 0.58**
(0.21) (0.25) (0.24) (0.66) (0.37) (0.29)
Business Development 1.21 1.15 1.19** −0.05 0.51 0.58**
(0.15) (0.14) (0.11) (0.24) (0.27) (0.23)
Promotions 1.13 0.99 1.10 0.17 0.21 0.24
(0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.26) (0.27) (0.17)
Baseline and fixed effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Log likelihood −12,524.40 −12,519.53 −12,475.50
Adj. R2 0.14 0.14 0.15
N Investments days 5209 5209 5209 5201 5201 5201
N Campaigns 70 70 70 71 71 71
This table shows results of our baseline regressions as specified in Section 3.5 as well as additional variables. The results of the baseline
regression remain largely unchanged and are therefore not reported again. Next to the variables reported in the table, the regressions also
include dummy variables for the campaign, day of the week, month of the year, year effects, as well as the first and last 7 days of the
campaign. Variable definitions are reported in Table 5 in the appendix . The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is the number of
investments and in columns (4) to (6) the Ln(Amount) of investments in a specific campaign and day. The data takes panel data structure.
The method of estimation in columns (1) to (3) is the negative binomial fixed effects panel estimator (standard errors are bootstrapped) and in
columns (4) to (6) the OLS fixed effects panel estimator (standard errors are clustered on campaign level). Standard errors are reported in
brackets
Significance levels for coefficients: **<5%, ***<1%
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crowdfunding participation. Updates that inform the crowd
about new funding and business developments seem to be
valued highly by investors. Updates providing information
about campaign developments and cooperation projects
also have a positive effect on crowd participation. In con-
trast to previous findings, investors did not seem to value
information about the start-up team (Ahlers et al. 2015;
Moritz et al. 2015; Bernstein et al. 2017). This result might
be explained by the fact that the start-up team typically does
not change during a crowdfunding campaign and that
investors expect to receive information about consistent
factors of the start-up directly at the beginning of the
campaign, e.g., in the business plan. This interpretation is
supported by the results regarding the business model.
Altogether, our results suggest that investors seem to value
updates signaling additional and dynamic aspects about the
start-up’s quality during a crowdfunding campaign and do
not value information which should have been provided at
the funding start. The negative effect of external certifica-
tions on crowd investments is rather surprising and indi-
cates that the crowd does not find expert opinions, success
stories, awards received, and patents obtained credible and
valuable. However, a deeper analysis of this categorywith a
larger data set is required to better understand the crowds’
reaction to this information.
Our paper contributes to the entrepreneurial finance and
crowdfunding literatures. We contribute to research on the
selection criteria of early-stage investors. It has been found
that start-ups use specific information such as the quality of
their management, intellectual property, the venture’s net-
work, and firm alliances to signal their quality to investors
(Audretsch et al. 2012; Baum and Silverman 2004; Block
et al. 2014; Franke et al. 2008; Jell et al. 2011). In our
analysis, we have shown that specific signals in
crowdfunding campaigns also seem to enhance the likeli-
hood of a successful campaign. Hence, our paper expands
research on signaling theory by analyzing effective signals
within updates during equity crowdfunding campaigns. In
addition, our paper contributes to the small but growing
literature on the effects of information disclosure on equity
crowdfunding participation (Vismara 2016b; Ahlers et al.
2015; Moritz et al. 2015; Moritz and Block 2015;
Bernstein et al. 2017). So far, this literature has not taken
into account that start-ups can also provide or disclose
information to the crowd while running an equity
crowdfunding campaign. Our analysis takes a dynamic
approach to this issue and investigates these disclosure
effects, considering updates that are given during ongoing
crowdfunding campaigns.
This paper is not without limitations, which provide
fruitful avenues for further research. Although we consider
two different portals, the sample size of 71 funding cam-
paigns and 39,399 investment decisions is still relatively
small. Our dataset is slightly biased. Extremely positive
crowdfunding campaigns, where the funding limit was
reached within a few hours, simply had no time (or need)
to publish updates. The sample size does not allow us to
build larger subgroups of start-ups from different indus-
tries, countries, and development stages. Future research
could collect larger samples of funding campaigns and
investigate potential moderation effects related to start-up
or campaign characteristics. We would expect, for exam-
ple, to see stronger positive effects of updates on patents
and successful prototypes in technology-intensive indus-
tries than in other industries. Our subsample of start-ups in
technology-intensive industries is too small to investigate
suchmoderation effects.Moreover, with a larger sample of
start-ups and campaigns, one could compare lone founder
start-ups with team start-ups. It might very well be that
updates on new teammembers have particularly meaning-
ful effects for lone founder start-ups, especially when the
founder lacks technological and/or business competences.
Another possible avenue for further research is to extend
the research about the effects of updates on crowd partic-
ipation to reward-based crowdfunding (Colombo et al.
2015; Mollick 2014; Xu et al. 2014). Mollick (2014), for
example, has shown that projects with updates are more
likely than other projects to attract funding from the crowd.
However, he does not distinguish between different types
of updates. Given the particularities of reward-based
crowdfunding and its strong focus on products and pro-
jects, we would expect updates with information about
project and product developments to have particularly
strong effects.
6 Implications for practice
Our paper’s results are important for start-ups seek-
ing equity crowdfunding. Knowing which updates
drive funding participation is crucial for start-ups
when designing an effective and successful investor
communication and social media strategy for their
equity crowdfunding campaigns. By posting up-
dates, start-ups can actively influence their cam-
paigns’ chances of success. The crowd seems par-
ticularly sensitive to verifiable and business-related
information about the development of the start-up
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since funding start such as new fundings and busi-
ness developments, whereas information about the
underlying business model, team, and promotional
activities does not provide much additional value. In
this sense, the crowd seems to behave like profes-
sional investors who focus on verifiable, business-
related, and cash-flow relevant additional informa-
tion as decision criteria for their investments
(Boocock and Woods 1997). This information is
also important for crowdfunding platforms. By en-
couraging start-ups to publish specific types of up-
dates that can increase the likelihood of successful
crowdfunding campaigns, the platforms’ own busi-
ness success will be improved.
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Appendix
Table 5 Definitions of variables
Dependent variables:
Ln(Amount): The natural logarithm of the amount of money in EUR invested by crowd investors on day t in campaign i.
#Investments: The number of investments made by crowd investors on day t in campaign i.
Control variables:
Ln(Amount 0 → t −1): The natural logarithm of the total amount of money in EUR invested by the crowd until the previous day
in campaign i.
#Investments 0 → t −1: The total number of investments made by the crowd until the previous day in a particular campaign.
Post Funded: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the campaign has surpassed the Funding Goal, and 0 otherwise.
Active Campaigns: The total number of campaigns across three major and one minor German equity crowdfunding portal
(Seedmatch, Companisto, Innovestment, and United Equity) accepting investments on day t.
Competing Investments: The total number of investments made on day t across all campaigns ran on three
major and one minor German equity crowdfunding portal (Seedmatch, Companisto, Innovestment, and United Equity) that where
not attracted by campaign i.
Equity Share: Is the amount of capital requested by the venture (funding goal) over its pre-money valuation.
Seedmatch: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the campaign was run on Seedmatch, and 0 if it was run on Companisto.
Explanatory variables—RQ1:
Update: The number of updates posted on the portal website by the start-up on day t in campaign i.
Update Number: Is the number of an update during the campaign. At a maximum, the campaign MyParfum on
Companisto counted 14 updates. For the lagged variables, we use the average of previous updates’ number.
Explanatory variables—RQ2:
Flesch Index: Is the Flesch Readability Index, using a categorization with a seven item scale (Courtis 1995), where 1
corresponds to a Flesch index of 0–30 Bvery difficult language,^ 2 to 31–50 Bdifficult,^ 3 to 51–60 Bfairly difficult,^ 4 to 61–70
Bstandard,^ 5 to 71–80 Bfairly easy,^ 6 to 81–90 Beasy,^ and 7 to 91–100 Bvery easy language.^ For the lagged variables,
we use the average of previous updates’ Flesch index.
Words: Is the total number of words that appeared in the update text. For the lagged variables, we use the average of
previous updates’ word count.
Explanatory variables—RQ3:
Team: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update contained information about the entrepreneurial team (education,
previous work experience), and 0 otherwise.
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Table 5 (continued)
Business Model: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update contained a description of the business model, the relevant market, or future
business orientation, and 0 otherwise.
External Certification: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update contained an expert opinion, success stories, news
about awards received, patent applications, patent approvals as well as press and media coverages about the start-up,
and 0 otherwise.
Product Development: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update contained information about the product, target costumers,
prototypes, or new product inventions, and 0 otherwise.
Cooperation Projects: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update contained information about new collaborations t
he start-up engaged in, and 0 otherwise.
Campaign Development: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update contained information about campaign updates
(number of crowd investors, achieved funding amount) or announcements that the funding limit has been changed,
and 0 otherwise.
New Funding: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update contained information of whether the start-up received
additional funding from business angels, venture capitalists or government grants, and 0 otherwise.
Business Development: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update contained information about the financial development
of the start-up and its customer base (e.g., number of customers, new customers), and 0 otherwise.
Promotions: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update contained information about promotions the crowd may receive
(discounts, perks), open calls to participate via social media, invitations for personal meetings (open house events)
and appeals to investors to support the start-up (marketing, recommendations, network), and 0 otherwise.
Table 6 Correlation matrix: update categories
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Investments (# per day) [1]
Ln(Amount in €) [2] 0.31
Team [3] 0.16 0.05
Business Model [4] 0.13 0.04 0.43
External Certification [5] 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.47
Product Development [6] 0.12 0.05 0.33 0.53 0.34
Cooperation Projects [7] 0.03 0.02 0.24 0.55 0.45 0.36
Campaign Development [8] 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.16
New Funding [9] 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.14 0.32 0.05 0.15 0.07
Business Development [10] 0.06 0.03 0.23 0.47 0.50 0.32 0.42 0.20 0.18
Promotions [11] 0.08 0.05 0.33 0.41 0.38 0.41 0.30 0.34 0.12 0.25
Words [12] 0.11 0.06 0.45 0.72 0.66 0.54 0.54 0.37 0.26 0.53 0.64
Flesch Index [13] 0.14 0.08 0.41 0.63 0.56 0.60 0.46 0.49 0.18 0.49 0.64 0.79
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Table 7 Effects of update categories by industry sector
Panel A: Manufacturing
Investments (# per day) Ln(Amount in €)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable lag None 1 day 1 week None 1 day 1 week
Explanatory variables
(lags according to table head)
Flesch Index 0.88 1.12*** 1.00 −0.12 0.08 0.01
(0.08) (0.05) (0.00) (0.12) (0.16) (0.01)
Words / 100 0.95 1.07 1.04 0.11 0.17 0.03
(0.14) (0.21) (0.07) (0.19) (0.27) (0.12)
Team 1.06 0.62*** 1.25 −1.65* −1.34* 0.38
(0.27) (0.09) (0.19) (0.92) (0.74) (0.34)
Business Model 0.88 0.90 1.02 0.16 −0.45 0.26
(0.25) (0.30) (0.28) (0.77) (0.52) (0.50)
External Certification 2.01* 0.90 1.23 −0.11 −0.72 −0.16
(0.74) (0.25) (0.43) (0.80) (0.56) (0.56)
Product Development 0.90 0.86 1.03 0.98** 0.71 −0.17
(0.24) (0.57) (0.11) (0.40) (0.45) (0.22)
Cooperation Projects 1.53 1.48 0.91 0.89 0.58 0.17
(0.45) (0.39) (0.11) (0.72) (0.38) (0.21)
Campaign Development 1.39 1.05 0.95 −0.76 0.18 −0.12
(0.51) (0.92) (0.24) (0.96) (0.61) (0.53)
New Funding 0.58 0.38 0.68 −0.95 0.07 0.46
(4.65) (0.44) (0.19) (1.76) (0.50) (0.56)
Business Development 1.03 1.19 0.96 −1.35** 0.20 −0.02
(0.35) (0.47) (0.11) (0.60) (0.73) (0.23)
Promotions 1.37 0.73 1.05 0.26 0.15 −0.08
(0.55) (0.37) (0.09) (0.59) (0.23) (0.18)
Baseline and fixed effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Log likelihood −12,530.29 −12,528.07 −12,515.02
Adj. R2 0.14 0.14 0.14
N Investments days 5209 5209 5209 5201 5201 5201
N Campaigns 70 70 70 71 71 71
Panel B: Wholesale and retail
Investments (# per day) Ln(Amount in €)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable lag None 1 day 1 week None 1 day 1 week
Explanatory variables
(lags according to table head)
Flesch Index 1.17 0.96 0.99 0.31* −0.47* −0.01
(0.12) (0.15) (0.00) (0.16) (0.24) (0.01)
Words / 100 0.97 1.00 0.98 0.14 0.36* 0.14
(0.07) (0.11) (0.04) (0.15) (0.19) (0.15)
Team 0.61* 0.96 1.03 −0.98** −0.34 0.13
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Table 7 (continued)
Panel B: Wholesale and retail
Investments (# per day) Ln(Amount in €)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable lag None 1 day 1 week None 1 day 1 week
(0.17) (0.57) (0.16) (0.41) (0.72) (0.74)
Business Model 2.00*** 1.45 0.65*** 0.26 0.05 −1.36**
(0.49) (0.98) (0.09) (0.65) (1.01) (0.55)
External Certification 2.01 0.85 0.90 0.71 −1.71** −1.48**
(0.88) (2.82) (0.12) (0.50) (0.81) (0.56)
Product Development 0.57* 0.89 1.02 −0.95 −0.31 0.25
(0.19) (0.36) (0.11) (0.78) (0.69) (0.47)
Cooperation Projects 0.71 1.29 1.72*** −0.23 1.64*** 1.86***
(0.22) (0.50) (0.23) (0.59) (0.50) (0.42)
Campaign Development 1.19 1.72 1.17 0.58 1.65*** 0.46
(0.21) (0.62) (0.13) (0.81) (0.59) (0.38)
New Funding 0.58 2.26 2.30*** 1.27 2.81*** 1.74**
(0.29) (7.43) (0.55) (0.81) (0.62) (0.74)
Business Development 0.86 0.88 1.61*** −0.69 0.63 1.71***
(0.26) (0.65) (0.18) (0.75) (0.68) (0.56)
Promotions 1.10 1.04 1.51*** 0.11 0.96* 1.22**
(0.40) (0.53) (0.15) (0.60) (0.57) (0.48)
Baseline and fixed effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Log likelihood −12,523.85 −12,538.39 −12,515.93
Adj. R2 0.14 0.14 0.15
N Investments days 5209 5209 5209 5201 5201 5201
N Campaigns 70 70 70 71 71 71
Panel C: Information and communication
Investments (# per day) Ln(Amount in €)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable lag None 1 day 1 week None 1 day 1 week
Explanatory variables
(lags according to table head)
Flesch Index 1.01 1.09 1.00 0.10 0.18 0.00
(0.06) (0.06) (0.00) (0.14) (0.20) (0.00)
Words / 100 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.06 −0.08 0.02
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.14) (0.08)
Team 1.59** 1.09 1.11 0.12 0.29 0.03
(0.31) (0.21) (0.16) (0.46) (0.55) (0.20)
Business Model 0.92 0.83 0.90 −0.61 −0.30 −0.02
(0.17) (0.14) (0.10) (0.39) (0.60) (0.25)
External Certification 0.76 1.17 1.00 −0.45* 0.31 −0.33**
(0.21) (0.23) (0.12) (0.23) (0.39) (0.16)
Product Development 1.07 1.18 1.10 0.58 0.16 0.32**
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Table 7 (continued)
Panel C: Information and communication
Investments (# per day) Ln(Amount in €)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable lag None 1 day 1 week None 1 day 1 week
(0.15) (0.19) (0.07) (0.39) (0.31) (0.16)
Cooperation Projects 1.05 0.79 0.77 −0.35 −0.22 −0.45**
(0.26) (0.12) (0.18) (0.35) (0.35) (0.21)
Campaign Development 1.19 1.16 1.36** −0.34 0.59 0.24
(0.16) (0.29) (0.20) (0.33) (0.48) (0.25)
New Funding 0.72 0.55 1.41 1.13* −1.02 −0.09
(0.37) (0.20) (0.39) (0.61) (0.95) (0.49)
Business Development 1.19 1.16 1.17 0.42 0.43 0.51***
(0.18) (0.17) (0.11) (0.26) (0.38) (0.13)
Promotions 1.12 0.92 1.15 0.39 −0.37 0.37
(0.14) (0.18) (0.16) (0.45) (0.53) (0.31)
Baseline and fixed effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Log Likelihood −12,520.00 −12,535.94 −12,523.06
Adj. R2 0.14 0.14 0.14
N Investments days 5209 5209 5209 5201 5201 5201
N Campaigns 70 70 70 71 71 71
Themethod of estimation in columns (1) to (3) is the negative binomial fixed effects panel estimator (standard errors are bootstrapped) and in
columns (4) to (6) the OLS fixed effects panel estimator (standard errors are clustered on campaign level). Standard errors are reported in
brackets
Significance levels for coefficients: **<5%, ***<1%
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Table 8 Effects of update categories by portal
Panel A: Seedmatch
Investments (# per day) Ln(Amount in €)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable lag None 1 day 1 week None 1 day 1 week
Explanatory variables
(lags according to table head)
Flesch Index 1.01 1.06 1.01 0.01 −0.37 0.01
(0.25) (0.28) (0.01) (0.30) (0.32) (0.01)
Words / 100 1.46 1.21 0.94 0.16 0.60 0.34
(0.47) (0.40) (0.18) (0.36) (0.49) (0.22)
Team 1.00 1.00 1.00 – – –
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) – – –
Business Model 0.44 1.30 1.03 −1.01 1.42 0.29
(0.33) (0.91) (0.61) (0.94) (1.35) (1.08)
External Certification 2.54 1.31 0.84 2.03** −1.15 −2.03***
(2.11) (7.91) (0.52) (0.88) (1.57) (0.75)
Product Development 0.52 0.68 0.79 0.73 0.88 −0.77
(0.46) (0.63) (0.41) (1.10) (1.29) (0.59)
Cooperation Projects 1.74 0.94 1.44 0.32 −0.23 1.34***
(1.62) (0.66) (0.53) (1.74) (0.71) (0.47)
Campaign Development 1.40 2.49 1.91 1.86** 1.94* 0.60
(0.82) (2.06) (1.04) (0.90) (1.06) (0.57)
New Funding 0.16 0.28 0.83 −2.17 −0.22 −0.14
(0.87) (1.72) (0.73) (2.91) (2.48) (0.87)
Business Development 0.34 1.07 1.26 −1.73* 1.08* 0.94**
(0.35) (0.64) (0.40) (1.03) (0.60) (0.41)
Promotions 0.37 0.75 0.88 −1.27 −0.02 −0.14
(0.52) (0.80) (0.45) (1.36) (1.40) (0.47)
Baseline and fixed effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Log likelihood −12,529.63 −12,525.12 −12,521.54
Adj. R2 0.14 0.14 0.15
N Investments days 5209 5209 5209 5201 5201 5201
N Campaigns 70 70 70 71 71 71
Panel B: Companisto
Investments (# per day) Ln(Amount in €)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable lag None 1 day 1 week None 1 day 1 week
Explanatory variables
(lags according to table head)
Flesch Index 1.02 1.07** 1.00 0.05 0.14 0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.00) (0.08) (0.09) (0.01)
Words / 100 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.11* −0.02 −0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Team 1.04 0.87 1.10 −0.34 −0.22 0.38*
Which updates increase crowd participation?
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